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Abstract
Background: To reduce fatal drug overdoses, two approaches many states have followed is to pass laws expanding
naloxone access and Good Samaritan protections for lay persons with high likelihood to respond to an opioid
overdose. Most prior research has examined attitudes and knowledge among lay responders in large
metropolitan areas who actively use illicit substances. The present study addresses current gaps in knowledge
related to this issue through an analysis of data collected from a broader group of lay responders who
received naloxone kits from 20 local health departments across Indiana.
Methods: Postcard surveys were included inside naloxone kits distributed in 20 Indiana counties, for which
217 returned cards indicated the person completing it was a lay responder. The survey captured
demographic information and experiences with overdose, including the use of 911 and knowledge about
Good Samaritan protections.
Results: Few respondents had administered naloxone before, but approximately one third had witnessed a
prior overdose and the majority knew someone who had died from one. Those who knew someone who
had overdosed were more likely to have obtained naloxone for someone other than themselves. Also,
persons with knowledge of Good Samaritan protections or who had previously used naloxone were
significantly more likely to have indicated calling 911 at the scene of a previously witnessed overdose.
Primary reasons for not calling 911 included fear of the police and the person who overdosed waking up on
their own.
Conclusions: Knowing someone who has had a fatal or non-fatal overdose appears to be a strong
motivating factor for obtaining naloxone. Clarifying and strengthening Good Samaritan protections, educating
lay persons about these protections, and working to improve police interactions with the public when they
are called to an overdose scene are likely to improve implementation and outcomes of naloxone distribution
and opioid-related Good Samaritan laws.
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Background
Opioid-related overdoses are now the leading cause of
preventable death in the USA [1–3]. In an effort to quell
the rising tide of opioid overdose deaths, every US state
and the District of Columbia have passed laws improving
both first responder and lay responder—i.e., regular citizens
who are in a position to respond to an opioid overdose—
access to naloxone (also known by the brand name Nar-
can), the opioid antagonist used to reverse the symptoms of
an opioid overdose [4, 5]. Illicit opioids, including natural
opioids mixed with synthetic analogs and pure synthetic
analogs, are extremely potent and can require multiple
doses of naloxone to counteract. Therefore, it is recom-
mended that administration of naloxone be coupled with
appropriate emergency medical care in case follow-up sup-
portive care and additional doses of naloxone are needed
[6, 7]. However, many lay responders do not call 911 [8–
10] because they fear legal repercussions (e.g., arrest, loss of
public housing, or benefits) [8, 9, 11–20]. It is for this rea-
son that, as of July 2017, 40 states have passed Good Sa-
maritan laws/protections that safeguard individuals who
report an overdose in “good faith” from certain criminal
sanctions [21], with specific protections varying by state.
Demonstrated effectiveness of naloxone education and
distribution programs supports the rationale behind nalox-
one access and Good Samaritan laws that bystanders should
not fear legal repercussions for offering assistance to some-
one injured or otherwise incapacitated [22–25]. Moreover,
public and professional attitudes generally support these
laws [26–28]. Yet, studies continue to demonstrate 911 is
frequently not called despite the presence of a Good Samar-
itan law due to either a lack of awareness or continued fear
of criminal liability [20, 29–31]. These studies have largely
focused on lay responders who are themselves opioid users
(primarily injection opioid users), and each study is gener-
ally focused on a population from a limited urban geo-
graphic area (e.g., a single city or metropolitan area). The
current study adds to this literature by examining data from
a naloxone distribution program operating in 20 counties
across Indiana that provided naloxone to lay responders.
Each county’s local health department was provided with
the naloxone kits through a grant mechanism administered
by the Indiana State Department of Health. Our results
focus on the variation in experiences between those who
obtained naloxone for someone else and those who ob-
tained it for themselves as well as reasons for not having
previously called 911 during an overdose.
Methods
Postcard surveys were included inside naloxone kits
distributed in 20 Indiana counties. Postcard surveys can
be useful for obtaining survey data from research sub-
jects who lack time to fill out long questionnaires and/or
may perceive such questionnaires as burdensome [32].
The number of kits distributed in each county ranged
from 10 to 400 (M = 94; Mdn = 50). According to the US
Census [33], county populations ranged from 23,087 to
903,393 (M = 103,641; Mdn = 37,800), and all popula-
tions were between 87 and 98% White, except for the
largest county, which was 63% White. Only eight coun-
ties could be considered urban (or to have urban areas)
in that they had a sizable number of their population
living in a metropolitan area [34].
Respondents
Survey respondents are individuals who obtained a
naloxone kit from their local health department. A total
of 3474 kits were provided to health departments. Of
these, approximately 1767 kits were distributed 1 year
later (based on kit distribution information supplied by
the health departments), for which we received 767
completed postcards (an estimated response rate of
about 43%). Researchers were originally informed that
the kits were only being made available to lay re-
sponders; however, our data demonstrated a number of
professional first responders and other health care pro-
fessionals were accessing the kits (likely due to limited
availability through their employers). Our analysis in this
paper focuses on lay responders (i.e., survey respondents
who indicated they obtained the naloxone kit for them-
selves, a family member, and/or friend).
Measures
Each postcard requested demographic information, in-
cluding age, zip code, gender, and race/ethnicity, and
asked respondents to indicate who they obtained the kit
for (e.g., themselves, a family member, a friend, a client
or patient, or “other” reason). The postcard requested
information on the respondent’s experiences with opioid
overdose, including if (1) they know anyone who has
experienced a fatal or non-fatal overdose, (2) how many
overdoses they have witnessed, and (3) how recently (i.e.,
within the past month, last year, or more than a year
ago) they have witnessed an overdose. As a follow-up
question, respondents were asked whether 911 was
called at the scene of the last overdose witnessed and, if
not, the reason why 911 was not called (i.e., worried
about police, person woke up on their own, no phone
available, they did not want to upset the victim). Lastly,
respondents were asked if they are aware of the law that
protects witnesses from drug charges when 911 is called
to the scene of an overdose and if they have previously
administered naloxone prior to receiving the kit.
Procedures
The back side of the postcard included instructions
describing the research purpose, the confidential nature
of the study, when to complete the postcard survey, and
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how to return the postcard. All postcards were pre-
addressed and included pre-paid postage, and the par-
ticipant was asked to return the card via any US mail
postbox. Each health department was sent an informa-
tion sheet about the survey that asked them to inform
lay responders of the postcard at the time the kit was
provided. Health department staff were also requested to
encourage lay responders to complete the survey after
receiving the kit. Lay responders were not required to
complete the postcard. Researchers provided each health
department with a drop box where respondents could
place the card in if they chose to fill it out before leaving;
health department staff were instructed to regularly
empty this box into the US mail. Researchers followed
up with a staff member at each health department to
ensure the information was received and understood.
Naloxone kits were distributed between September 9,
2016, and February 9, 2017.
Analysis
To ensure the analysis focused on lay responders, all in-
dividuals who indicated obtaining the kit for a client or
patient or who did not indicate who they obtained the
kit for were excluded. Of the 767 postcards returned,
235 were identified as being completed by lay responders
(the rest being first responders or were unidentifiable
due to missing data); however, after excluding cases with
missing variables (n = 18; 7.7%), we were left with a final
sample of 217 cases. Of these cases, an additional 5.5%
(n = 12) had data imputed. We only imputed data if it
could logically be discerned from the respondent’s an-
swers to previous questions. For instance, if respondents
indicated they had never witnessed an overdose, we im-
puted data for subsequent unanswered overdose ques-
tions as “I haven’t seen an overdose.” Descriptive and
correlation statistics were used to examine and describe
the results of the postcard data. Statistical tests that were
performed include t-tests and chi-square (χ2) difference
of proportion tests. The level of significance was α = 0.
05, with all p values lower than that value considered
statistically significant.
Results
The sample’s demographic characteristics are displayed
in Table 1. The average age of respondents was 47.2 years
(SD = 14.8), and over two thirds (n = 151; 69.5%) were
over age 40. Slightly more than half (55.3%) were female,
and the majority were White (88.0%). Among those
coded as non-White, 76.9% (n = 20) were Black, 0.1%
(n = 2) were Asian, 0.1% (n = 3) were American
Indian/Alaskan Native, and 0.2% (n = 5) indicated
multiple race/ethnicity categories.
Table 2 displays the items measuring past experiences
with naloxone and overdose and knowledge regarding
Good Samaritan protections. Few respondents (7.4%)
had used naloxone before; however, approximately
two thirds (62.2%) knew someone who had overdosed
from opioids, and nearly half (47.9%) knew someone
who had died from an opioid overdose. Over one
third (n = 75; 34.6%) had directly witnessed an opioid
overdose; among these cases most witnessed only
one. Among those who reported having witnessed an
overdose (n = 75), 85.3% had their most recent experi-
ence sometime in the past year. When asked if some-
one called 911 at this most recent overdose
experience, 80.0% reported they had. Among those
who did not call 911, the most common reasons were
that they were worried about the police (n = 6), the
person woke up on their own (n = 5), the person was
transported to a hospital (n = 3), or an unspecified
reason (n = 4).
Intended naloxone recipient
Next explored were variations in prior experiences and
knowledge of Indiana’s Good Samaritan protections by
who the respondent indicated they were getting the na-
loxone kit for. For this, two categories of lay re-
sponder were created based on the intended recipient of
the naloxone: (1) those indicating they obtained the kit
for themselves (i.e., marked “self” on the survey) and (2)
those who indicated they obtained the kit for others (i.e.,
marked “family” or “friend” on the survey). Those who
indicated obtaining the kit for both self and others,
which were only three cases (1.4%), were placed in the
“other” category. This resulted in 38.7% (n = 84) of the
Table 1 Sample demographics (N = 217)
M (SD)
Age 47.2 (14.8)
N (%)
Sex
Female 120 (55.3)
Male 97 (44.7)
Race/minority status
Non-White 26 (12.0)
White 191 (88.0)
Age categories
Under 19 5 (2.3)
20–29 27 (12.4)
30–39 34 (15.7)
40–49 50 (23.0)
50–59 54 (24.9)
60–69 32 (14.7)
70 and over 15 (6.9)
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respondents being placed into the “self” category and 61.
3% (n = 133) in the “other” category.
Differences in demographics and prior experiences
based on whom the respondent indicated they were
obtaining the naloxone for were examined. Those who
indicated they obtained naloxone for themselves were
significantly younger than those who obtained it for
someone else (43.1 and 49.7 years, respectively; t = 3.
26, p = .001) and were also more likely to be non-
White (17.9 and 8.3%; χ2 = 4.48, p = .034). There were
no significant differences by gender, though a greater
portion of females reported obtaining naloxone for others
than males (58.6 and 41.4%, respectively; p = .212), and
among those who obtained naloxone for themselves,
gender was evenly split (n = 42; 50.0%; p = .212) between
males and females.
In looking at prior experiences, those who indicated
obtaining naloxone for others were significantly more
likely to know someone who had overdosed (75.9 vs. 40.
5%; χ2 = 27.54, p < .000), know someone who had died of
an overdose (57.1 vs. 33.3%; χ2 = 11.69, p = .001), or have
witnessed an overdose (42.9 vs. 21.4%; χ2 = 10.45, p = .001)
than those who obtained naloxone for themselves (see Fig.
1). Among those who witnessed an overdose, there was no
difference in how recently they had seen the overdose or
whether they had called 911 at the scene of the overdose by
whom they obtained the naloxone for, nor were there any
differences in knowledge about Good Samaritan
protections and whom the naloxone was obtained for.
Calling 911 and knowledge of Good Samaritan laws
A separate analysis was conducted on the subsample of
respondents who indicated they had called or not called
911 at the scene of the last overdose they witnessed (n =
75) to understand if there was any association between
this behavior and (a) respondent demographics, (b) prior
experiences with naloxone and overdose, or (c) know-
ledge of Good Samaritan protections. There was no vari-
ation by age, race/ethnicity, or gender, nor were there
any differences in whether the respondent knew some-
one who had died of an overdose. However, as demon-
strated in Fig. 2, those with knowledge of Good
Samaritan protections were significantly more likely to
have called 911 (84.7 vs. 15.3%; χ2 = 3.89, p = .048), and
those who had used naloxone before were significantly
more likely to have called 911 than those did not (56.3
vs. 86.4%; χ2 = 7.17, p = .007).
Discussion
Findings from this study are unique in that they focus
on responses of the broader lay responder population
(rather than just current opioid users) and included a
more geographically heterogeneous population than
prior work on this topic that we are aware of. Our study
revealed that few survey respondents had administered
naloxone, but a large portion indicated having witnessed
an overdose or knowing someone who had died from an
overdose. Furthermore, these experiences were reported
at significantly higher rates among those who indicated
obtaining naloxone for someone other than themselves.
These findings are consistent with studies showing that
witnessing an overdose or knowing someone who died
from an overdose is potentially a strong motivator for
first time naloxone access [35]. However, a better under-
standing of the broader lay responder population’s
awareness and motivations for obtaining naloxone could
greatly benefit prevention efforts.
Findings from this study also suggest that among those
who had witnessed an overdose, knowledge of the Good
Samaritan protections and prior naloxone administration
were significantly associated with having called 911. This
is consistent with Jakubowski et al. [36] who found cor-
rect knowledge of a Good Samaritan law was associated
with calling 911 among individuals trained in naloxone
Table 2 Experience with overdose and knowledge of Good
Samaritan protections (N = 217)
N (%) Yes
Have you used naloxone before? (Yes) 16 (7.4)
Do you know anyone who has overdosed
from opioids? (Yes)
135 (62.2)
Do you know anyone who has died from
an opioid overdose? (Yes)
104 (47.9)
Are you aware of the law that protects
overdose victims and witnesses
from drug charges when 911 is called
to the scene of an overdose?
168 (77.4)
N (%)
About how many opioid overdoses
have you witnessed?
None 142 (65.4)
1 overdose 30 (13.8)
2 overdoses 17 (7.8)
3 overdoses 10 (4.6)
4 overdoses 6 (2.8)
5 overdoses 6 (2.8)
6 or more overdoses 6 (2.8)
When was the last time you witnessed
an opioid overdose?
Within the past month 33 (44.0)
Within the past 12 months 31 (41.3)
More than a year ago 11 (14.7)
At the last opioid overdose scene you
witnessed, did someone call 911?
Yes 60 (80.0)
No 15 (20.0)
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administration. Also consistent with previous research,
we found that among those who did not call 911,
concerns about the police were an underlying reason
[8, 9, 11–20], with a secondary reason being that the
person woke up on their own. As others have sug-
gested, this finding could indicate an overall lack of
trust of police or past negative personal experiences
with law enforcement [27, 36–38]. Indeed, some re-
spondents in our sample wrote messages in the mar-
gins of the postcard indicating they had heard of
others being mistreated despite the law or they be-
lieve the police would begin watching their home or
“stalking” them even if they did not arrest them at
the time of the overdose.
More than three quarters (77.4%) of respondents indi-
cated knowledge of Indiana’s Good Samaritan protec-
tions: 76.2% among those obtained naloxone for
themselves and 78.2% among those obtained it for some-
one else. Without a baseline comparison, it is difficult to
know if this is high or low, though it is likely high given
respondents self-selected to obtain naloxone, with many
of them obtaining it for someone other than themselves.
Certainly, future research is needed to understand
general public knowledge around Indiana’s opioid Good
Samaritan protections (and Good Samaritan laws in gen-
eral), but it is also possible there is general confusion
around the legislation, which provides some criminal, as
well as civil, protections to lay persons administering na-
loxone at the scene of an overdose [39, 40]. However,
these protections are not comprehensive, as they do not
extend to the person who overdosed, and it is unclear to
what extent they cover witnesses at the scene of the
overdose who did not administer naloxone and/or initi-
ate the 911 call. Furthermore, those protections offered
Fig. 2 Knowledge of Good Samaritan protections, prior naloxone use, and calling 911 (n = 75). *p < .05, **p < .01
Fig. 1 Prior overdose experience and intended naloxone recipient (N = 217). **p < .01, ***p < .001
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to the lay responder are limited in that they only cover
criminal liability for possession of drugs or parapherna-
lia, making it less likely someone would call if they were
at risk for other offenses (e.g., violating parole, having a
current warrant for arrest issued, or public intoxication).
The limitations of Good Samaritan laws are a noted
problem across the USA [4, 6, 21, 41], and strengthening
protections offered to lay responders and extending
them to the overdose survivors and all witnesses at the
scene have potential for improving compliance.
Related to lay responder fears concerning police, an
even more recent development in Indiana that has
potential to seriously weaken the intended results of the
state’s Good Samaritan protections is the passage of a
new drug-induced homicide law passed in March 2018
[42]. Drug-induced homicide laws exist in 20 other
states, and they raise the penalties associated with deal-
ing drugs should said drugs result in an overdose death
[43]. Indiana’s law would raise the penalties associated
with opioid dealing to a Level 1 Felony and is broad
enough to include any exchange of drugs, regardless of a
monetary transaction, to be considered dealing (e.g., shar-
ing with friends or a loved one). Despite an increased im-
plementation of drug-induced homicide legislation, there
is currently no evidence supporting the effectiveness of
such laws. Indeed, previous research has demonstrated in-
creasing criminal sanctions does not result in less drug de-
mand or sales (see [43–45]). Lay responder awareness of
these could result in less willingness to call emergency re-
sponders due to greater fear of criminal prosecution (for
themselves and/or others present at the overdose scene),
thus increasing the risk of overdose death.
While the findings in this study offer insight into the
motivations, attitudes, and experiences of lay persons
who obtain naloxone, it is not without limitations. Most
obvious are limits on information that could be gathered
(given the room available on the postcard instrument)
and our response rate. However, a strength of the post-
card method is that more people likely responded than
would have if a more time-consuming survey approach
had been used [32], and the response rate is higher than
expected considering members of the public who access
naloxone from an anonymous, government-run distribu-
tion program are unlikely to want to participate in data
collection activities, no matter how streamlined they
might be. Additionally, inconsistent distribution num-
bers from health departments required us to estimate
the response rate based on information available. This
was a reality we had to deal with when working with
local health departments, as they are often understaffed
and have limited resources, which can affect reporting.
It cannot be assured that those indicating they obtained
naloxone for someone other than themselves are not
also opioid users or whether their knowledge about the
existence of Good Samaritan protections is consistent
with the facts regarding these laws. However, despite
these limitations, this study represents a wider lay re-
sponder population than has been examined in similar
studies, and our multi-county sample is broader than
those included in most previous naloxone distribution
research.
Conclusions
In closing, the results of this study point to prior experi-
ence as an opioid overdose witness or knowing someone
who died of an opioid overdose as potential motivators
for naloxone access among lay responders. Results also
demonstrate reluctance among some lay responders to
call 911 at an overdose scene despite knowledge of Good
Samaritan protections. Additional research is needed to
better understand factors motivating naloxone access
and compliance with opioid Good Samaritan laws
among lay responders who are not themselves opioid
users. Finally, efforts to improve implementation of
naloxone access and Good Samaritan laws could be
strengthened through more intensive public education
and efforts to improve interactions between police and
people who use illicit opioids.
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